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PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
SALE

Recent cases have taken the view that where a buyer gives
a worthless check in payment of that which he buys the transaction is considered as equivalent to theft. In consequence, the
purported sale is void ab initio and the seller will be protected
even as against subsequent bona fide purchasers.' In Flatte v.
Nichols, 2 the seller accepted a check for the price of an automobile and gave the buyer a writing reciting a cash price and
stating that there were no notes or conditional sales contracts
held by the seller. This was held to have converted the transaction into a credit sale so that the buyer acquired title notwithstanding that the check was subsequently dishonored. It was
also said that the seller's conduct gave rise to an estoppel in
favor of the innocent third party purchaser who relied on the
indicia of ownership with which the buyer had been clothed.
The court observed that the provisions of the Louisiana Motor
Vehicle Title Certificate Law3 have not modified Article 2456 of
the Civil Code.
Under R.S. 45:940 (2) which is Section 40 (b) of the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act, when goods are shipped under a shipper'sorder-notify bill-of-lading if, except for the form of the bill, the
property in the goods would have passed to the buyer on shipment, the seller's reservation of an interest in the goods by
virtue of the form of the bill is deemed to be only for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer. This kind of bill
enables the shipper to retain a degree of control over the shipment that otherwise he would not have. The provision has been
enforced elsewhere in keeping with its purpose, i.e., to shift the
risk during transit to the purchaser where goods are sold f.o.b.
point of shipment, and at the same time, to permit the seller
to retain control of the shipment. 4 The holdings in Louisiana
have not been too clear. In California Fruit Exchange v. John
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Fisher v. Bullington, 223 La. 368, 65 So.2d 880 (1953) ; Hub City Motors,
Inc. v. Brock, 71 So.2d 700 (La. App. 1954).
2. 96 So.2d 477 (La. 1957).
3. LA. R.S. 32:705 (1950).
4. BUGAN, WHEN DOES Ti=a PASS FROM SHIPPER TO CONSIGNEE 291-306
(1951).
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Meyer, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court ordered up for review a finding by the court of appeal that the section could not be applied
as written because the law of this state does not recognize divided incidents of ownership in personal property. Without
giving its opinion concerning this pronouncement the Supreme
Court decided that the risk remained with the seller during the
shipment because it was the understanding of the parties that
the transfer of ownership was to take place only after inspection
and acceptance at destination. In passing, however, the court
conceded the soundness of the contention that, whatever the law
had been prior to the adoption of the uniform act, under its provisions, risk will pass to the buyer at the point of shipment if it
would have passed except for the form of the bill. During the
last term, in C. W. Greeson Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp.," involving a shipment "f.o.b. Milwaukee, Wisconsin" under a shipper'sorder-notify bill, the court said, "Prompted by a reluctance to
countenance any sort of splitting of the incidents of ownership,
our courts have construed this provision 7 to mean that, where
goods delivered f.o.b. to a carrier are consigned to the vendor,
the risk of loss remains in said vendor during transit unless there
is an express agreement between the parties that the risk is
assumed by the vendee upon delivery to the carrier." Cited in
support were, directly, Gerde-Newman & Co. v. Louisiana
Stores,8 and, indirectly, the CaliforniaFruit Exchange case. The
former, as was true of the latter case, actually rested on a finding that there was no intention to pass title until after inspection
and acceptance at destination. Consequently, neither can be
counted as solid authority for the proposition that, notwithstanding the statutory provision, the risk will not shift to the buyer
in a sale f.o.b. point of shipment if the shipper is named as consignee. Contrary to the findings of intention in the cited cases,
the court in the instant case found specifically that the intended
place of delivery was Milwaukee. It also recognized the general
rule that when goods are delivered f.o.b. point of shipment pursuant to contract, the presumption is that the property then
passes. Here, then, the parties intended for delivery to take place
in Milwaukee when the goods were shipped, so that risk would
then pass, but the opinion indicates this intention could not be
given effect because the seller had undertaken to reserve the
5.
6.
7.
8.

166 La. 9, 116 So. 575 (1928).
231 La. 934, 93 So.2d 221 (1957).
LA.- R.S. 45:940(2) (1950).
144 So. 756 (La. App. 1932).
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property in the goods for purposes of security and because, to
permit him to do so while the risk was in the buyer, would be to
countenance divided incidents of ownership contrary to our law.
The provision in question is part of a uniform act and, if pos;sible to attain, uniformity of application is a desirable end. The
instant opinion actually recognizes that there is nothing in our
law to prevent an agreement between seller and buyer under
which risk of loss during shipment will be on the buyer although
the seller, by naming himself as consignee under the form of
bill in question, reserves a property in the goods for purposes
of securing performance by the buyer. Thus it is said that if
the goods are consigned to the shipper's order the risk will remain on him "unless there is an express agreement between the
parties that the risk is assumed by the vendee upon delivery to
the carrier." If to so agree is to split incidents of ownership,
then they can be split as long as they are split expressly. Our
law concerning the effect of sales f.o.b. point of shipment is
believed to be entirely consistent with the law generally. That
is, the title and risk will pass upon shipment. This result would
follow by virtue of Article 2456 of the Civil Code because it is
at that time the goods called for by the contract become specific
by their final appropriation to the contract so that there is then
a concurrence of thing, price, and consent. All that Section
45:940 (2) seems to provide is that this result will not be changed
merely by the seller's using a shipper's-order-notify bill-of-lading.
It is not clear why an express agreement to accomplish this end
should be required.
A conveyance of land from one fixed boundary to another
fixed boundary constitutes a sale per aversionem and the purchaser takes all the land between the stated boundaries although
he may get a greater quantity of land than called for by his title.
A sale of six acres of land described by boundaries was held
governed by this provision in Motichek v. Perriloux.12 The owner
was given judgment against a trespasser who removed timber
therefrom, in an amount equal to its stumpage value. The defendant was found to have acted in good faith despite plaintiff's
9. 172 La. 921, 136 So. 4 (1931).
10. 172 La. 923, 136 So. 5 (1931).
11. D. Kelham & Co. v. Carroll, Hoy & Co., 20 La. Ann. 111 (1868) ; Shuff v.
Morgan, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 592 (La. 1821). But see Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. St.
Louis Cypress Co., 121 La. 152, 46 So. 193 (1908).
12. 231 La. 849, 93 So.2d 190 (1957).
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contention to the contrary in support of his claim for the manufactured value of the timber.
In Armwood v. Kennedy, 13 the court rejected the contention
that the market value of property for purposes of the action of
lesion beyond moiety is to be determined by the "highest and
best use" to which the land may be put, a rule applicable in
expropriation cases. Article 2590 requires that the property must
be estimated according to the state in which it was, and the
value which it had, at the time of the sale. This should not be
taken as meaning that the value of property for subdivision development may not be considered in determining its true value
just as the value of land for mineral development purposes may
be considered in determining a question of lesion beyond moiety
provided that such a market value exists at the time. The ultimate question presented by the present facts would seem to have
been whether the land at the time of the sale had a market value
for subdivision development purposes that resulted in making
the price paid lesionary. The rule calls for a present actual value,
not a potential, conjectural, or speculative one. Actually, the evidence that the price paid was lesionary was wholly insufficient,
as the court observed.
In Broussard v. Ketchens,14 the court properly considered
both the value of the land subdivided into lots and the value of
the portion not so subdivided in determining a question of lesion
beyond moiety.
Louisiana R.S. 9:2945 requires as a prerequisite to cancellation of a bond for deed contract for non-payment by the buyer
that the latter be given forty-five days' notice by registered mail.
In Dozier v. Dixie Land Co., 5 the court rendered judgment
against a vendor who failed to comply with this provision, in
an amount representing the full value of the property less the
amount due on the purchase price. This legislation recognizes
that purchasers under such contracts are generally not as well
informed as are sellers nor, consequently, as qualified to protect
themselves against sharp practices, and is aimed at giving them
a degree of protection that their situation demands. It is well to
find the court saying that its provisions are "clear and mandatory." In the case before it the vendor had sold the property to
13. 231 La. 102, 90 So.2d 793 (1956).
14. 231 La. 508, 91 So.2d 775 (1956).
15. 231 La. 834, 93 So.2d 185 (1957).
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another before taking any step whatsoever to cancel the contract,
although the alleged default of the vendee was of dubious character.
LEASE

In Fazzio v. Riverside Realty Co.,' premises constructed for
and leased to plaintiff for use as a bowling alley contained structural defects that resulted in considerable damage to the bowling
lanes. A judgment granting damages in an amount required to
repair the lanes was affirmed; but plaintiff's prayer for a judgment ordering the lessor to repair the structure so as to remedy
the defects or, in the alternative, for judicial authorization to
plaintiff to cause the necessary repairs to be made and to deduct
the cost from the rent was rejected. Also rejected as too speculative "at this time" was plaintiff's claim for business losses to
result while the repairs were being made. Although the rejection
of plaintiff's prayer for an order directing the lessor to make
the repairs to the building finds support in Civil Code Article
1927, it appears that by virtue of Article 2694 a method is provided by which the same end may be attained. This article provides that where a lessor fails to make "necessary repairs" the
"lessee may himself cause them to be made, and deduct the cost
from the rent." However, the lessee must prove that the repairs
were "indispensable" and the price paid "just and reasonable."
Hence the propriety of the court's rejection of plaintiff's request
for authorization to make the repairs qualified by the reservation of his right to take any action appropriate to him Under the
law.
A lessee failed in his attempt in Riggs v. Lawton 2 to recover
the amount spent by him in adding a room and bath of brick
veneer to the leased premises with the knowledge and consent of
the lessor. Article 508 of the Civil Code was held not applicable
since the lessee did not possess as owner. Although the lessor
was entitled to retain the improvements, she had elected not to
do so. The court did not pass on the question of whether the
lessee was entitled to remove the addition, but noted that such a
1. 232 La. 794, 95 So.2d 315 (1957).
2. 231 La. 1019, 93 So.2d 543 (1957).
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privilege exists under Article 2726 as long as the premises are
left in the state in which the lessee receives them.
In Mayfield v. Poche,8 it was held that the purchaser of a
going business, together with the lease to the property on which
its operations were conducted, acquired as an accessory thereof
certain recorded subleases executed by the vendors, and became
entitled to the rentals payable thereunder.
In Arms v. Rodriguez,4 an earlier decision 5 was relied on to,
support the holding that a lessor had waived a provision of the
lease contract authorizing cancellation of the lease for non-payment of taxes, by accepting rent subsequent to the sending of
notice of the violation. Although Justice McCaleb recognized
that the instant holding had substantial support in the earlier
case, he disagreed with the court's finding of waiver. The only
point of substantial difference between the two cases was that
in the earlier one the lessor accepted rent after demanding that
the lessee vacate the premises whereas in the instant case the
initial letter merely notified the lessee of the violation and did
not call upon him to vacate the premises. Indeed, after notice to
vacate was mailed the lessor refused to accept a subsequent
tender of rent. It appears that the instant case might well have
been distinguished on this basis. The mere fact that the lessor
accepted rent covering the continued occupancy of the tenant
after having called the latter's attention to his failure to pay the
taxes seems hardly strong enough to justify a finding of intentional relinquishment of a known right. Rather it appears that
the lessor was simply being tolerant with respect to the
lessee's remedying the breach and in the meantime continued to
take what was due him for the continued use and occupancy of
the premises. In addition, the holding in the former case was
that the suit was premature since the acceptance of rent subsequent to the notice to vacate had nullified the required notice.
Here it was said that the lessor's action "constituted a forgiveness of all previously committed infractions and served to reinstate the lease as of that time."
3. 96 So.2d 53 (La. 1957).
4. 232 La. 951, 95 So.2d 616 (1957).
5. Canal Realty & Improvement Co. v. Pallet, 217 La. 376, 46 So.2d 303
(1950).
6. Arms v. Rodriguez, 232 La. 951, 957, 95 So.2d 616, 618 (1957).

